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Abstract 
 
We examine whether financial covenants in loan contracts motivate banks to monitor 
borrowers’ financial reporting practices and result in a higher quality of reported accruals. 
We document that, relative to loans without financial covenants, loans with financial 
covenants lead to a significant improvement in accrual quality measured by the extent to 
which accruals can be mapped into cash flows. The effect of loan covenants on accrual 
quality is stronger when external monitoring by non-bank stakeholders (i.e., institutional 
investors and financial analysts) is weaker. Furthermore, initiations of bank loans with 
financial covenants are related to subsequent improvements in analysts’ information 
environment. The evidence supports the view that bank monitoring improves accounting 
quality. 
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1. Introduction 
 Corporate finance theories state that bank lenders are delegated monitors of 
firm performance due to their stake at risk in the firm and their information advantage 
(Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). Consistent with the theory, a number of empirical 
studies have documented that bank monitoring affects borrowers’ CEO successions 
(Marshall, McCann and McColgan, 2014), CEO risk taking incentives (Saunders and 
Song, 2018), dividend policies (Low et al., 2001), and investments (Nini, Smith and 
Sufi, 2009). However, much less is known about whether banking monitoring affects 
the quality of borrowers’ accounting information that has been widely used in loan 
contracts. 1  One exception is Ahn and Choi (2009) who find a cross-sectional 
association between earnings quality and loan amount, loan maturity and the number 
of lenders, consistent with banking monitoring improving earnings quality.2 However, 
Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) interpret the same cross-sectional association as 
suggesting that better earning quality results in better loan terms. Therefore, clear 
evidence on the effect of bank monitoring on accrual quality is still lacking in the 
literature. 
Banks have strong incentives to closely monitor firms’ financial reporting 
practices because loan contracts contain financial covenants that are often based on 
reported accounting numbers. To ensure financial covenants work effectively as “trip 
wires” and provide timely warnings to banks, the accounting numbers underlying the 
financial covenants must be free from manipulations and truthfully reflect borrowers’ 
                                                     
1 See Armstrong, Guay and Weber (2010) for a review of literature on accounting information and debt 
contracting. 
2 Another exception is Jha, Shankar, and Prakash (2015) who use data from India and find a positive 
association between the absolute value of discretional accruals (a measure of earnings quality) and the 
number of banks and bank loans as a percentage of total debt. Their results on the number of lenders 
are contradictory to those in Ahn and Choi (2009). Jha et al. acknowledge that institutional differences 
may prevent their results from being generalizable to other markets. 
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performance and risk. Indeed, accounting researchers argue and find that, since 
debtholders are more sensitive to downside risk, debtholders demand borrowers have 
conservative financial reporting that reflects bad news in a more timely manner 
(Watts, 2003; Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010). Therefore, bank 
monitoring should improve the quality of reported accounting numbers.  
In this study, we aim to provide direct evidence on whether the initiations of 
bank loans with financial covenants lead to improvement in the quality of reported 
accruals. To shed light on the direction of causality, we adopt an event study design 
and focus on the changes in borrowers’ accrual quality in the quarters after the bank 
loan initiations. While accrual quality before loan initiations could affect loan 
decisions, as suggested by Bharath et al. (2008), the changes in borrowers’ accrual 
quality following loan initiations are likely to be driven by bank monitoring. Unlike 
prior studies that measure earnings quality by discretional accruals estimated from 
various variations of Jones’ model (1991), we follow Dechow and Dichev (2002) to 
use the mapping between accruals and cash flows to measure accrual quality for two 
reasons. First, the estimated discretional accruals have been shown to be extremely 
noisy and have low power to detect accrual manipulations.3 Second, banks focus more 
on cash flows, and the extent to which accruals can be translated into cash flow is 
likely to be a focus of banks’ monitoring.  
 Using data from Dealscan, we identify a sample of public firms that obtain 
bank loans during the period from 1988 to 2012. We focus on the comparison 
                                                     
3 For example, Jackson (2017) shows that discretional accruals estimated from cross-sectional Jones’ 
models do not have much association with accounting frauds identified by Securities and Exchanges 
Commissions. As an illustration, the estimated discretional accruals for Enron during its fraud years 
were negative and large in magnitude, contradictory to the upward earnings manipulations by Enron in 
those years.   
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between loans with and without financial covenants.4 We expect that banks have a 
stronger incentive to monitor borrowers’ financial reporting practice and accrual 
quality when the loans have financial covenants. Consequently, we expect to find a 
larger improvement in borrowers’ accrual quality after the initiation of bank loans 
with financial covenants, relative to the initiation of loans without financial covenants. 
The empirical results are consistent with our expectation. We find that in the eight 
quarters following the initiations of bank loans, the existence and the number of 
financial covenants are both positively and statistically significantly associated with 
the improvement in accrual quality. This result is obtained after we control for 
contemporaneous changes in firm characteristics such as firm size, cash flow 
volatility, operating cycles, market-to-book ratios and profitability.  
 We proceed to examine the cross-sectional variations of the monitoring role of 
banks. We first consider the structure of loan syndicates. In a loan syndicate the lead 
banks are often delegated to monitor the borrower’s performance, and we expect the 
monitoring incentive of lead banks increases with their stake in the loan. Consistent 
with this view, we find the effect of loan covenants on borrowers’ accrual quality is 
stronger when lead banks retain a larger portion of loans. Furthermore, we examine 
whether bank monitoring is a substitute for monitoring by other stakeholders. We find 
that the effect of loan covenants on borrowers’ accrual quality is stronger for 
borrowers with smaller size, lower institutional ownership and a smaller number of 
analysts following, suggesting that bank monitoring plays a more important role when 
monitoring by other stakeholders is weaker.  
                                                     
4 We do not compare firms with loans to firms without loans, because accruals are likely to be affected 
by external financing (Shan, Taylor, and Walter, 2009) and thus it is difficult to differentiate the effect 
of bank monitoring from the effect of debt issuance per se based on comparing firms with and without 
loans. 
5 
 
 Finally, we investigate whether the improvement in accrual quality benefits 
other users of borrowers’ financial information such as financial analysts. The results 
show that financial covenants are positively associated with analysts’ forecast 
accuracy and negatively associated with analysts’ forecast dispersions. Using the 
measures of the precision of analysts’ information developed by Barron et al. (1998), 
we show that financial covenants are positively related to precision of analysts’ public 
and private information. Overall, the results suggest that improved accrual quality of 
borrowers allows financial analysts to have more precise information and issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts.  
 Our study is related to but distinct from prior studies on the ‘debt covenant 
hypothesis’ that proposes that debt covenants give incentives to managers to manage 
accounting numbers to avoid covenant violations. 5  The hypothesis, while being 
consistent with positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), seems to 
overlook the monitoring role of debtholders. Most empirical tests on this hypothesis 
examine the earnings management measured by discretional accruals around actual 
violations of debt covenants. However, covenant violations also result in interventions 
and intensified monitoring by banks and other debtholders, making it unclear whether 
managers still desire to engage in earnings management under the close watch of 
debtholders. Consequently, the empirical evidence on the ‘debt covenant hypothesis’ 
remains largely mixed. Our study differs from these studies in several ways. First, we 
focus on the initiations of bank loans and examine the changes in accrual quality after 
the loan initiations. Second, we compare borrowers of bank loans with and without 
financial covenants, rather than firms with and without covenant violations. Third, we 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Healy and Palepu (1990), DeAngelo et al. (1994), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), 
Sweeney (1994), Dichev and Skinner (2002), Jaggi and Lee (2002), Stanley and Sharma (2011) and Jha 
(2013). 
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choose to use the mapping between accruals and cash flows to measure accrual 
quality, rather than noisy discretional accruals.  
 Our study is also related to Bharath et al. (2008) and Ahn and Choi (2009). 
While both papers find a cross-sectional association between borrowers’ earnings 
quality and loan terms such as loan amount and maturity, they have totally different 
interpretations. Ahn and Choi (2009) suggest that a larger loan amount and longer 
loan maturity capture the intensity of bank monitoring and thus the association 
implies that bank monitoring improves earnings quality. Bharath et al. (2008) interpret 
the association as suggesting that banks reward higher accounting quality with better 
loan terms, consistent with the argument that accounting quality affects cost of debt. 
Because both studies focus on the cross-sectional associations, it is difficult to 
establish the direction of causality and differentiate between these two competing 
explanations. Our study adopts an event study approach and examines the changes in 
accrual quality following the loan initiations. After controlling for other 
contemporaneous changes, we show that loans with financial covenants lead to larger 
improvement in accrual quality. The results from changes in accrual quality after loan 
initiations allow us to address the endogeneity concerns and draw the conclusion that 
bank monitoring improves accrual quality.  
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we show that bank 
monitoring could improve accounting quality. Despite a large number of theoretical 
studies on bank monitoring of borrowers’ behavior, there is limited evidence on the 
effect of bank monitoring on financial reporting. By examining the changes in accrual 
quality after loan initiations, our study provides direct evidence that bank monitoring 
leads to improved accrual quality. Furthermore, we show that the effect of bank 
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monitoring is stronger when other stakeholders’ monitoring is weaker, suggesting a 
substitute effect between external monitors.  
Second, we add to the literature on the relation between corporate debt and 
properties of accounting numbers. Most of the studies in this literature argue that high 
quality earnings and conservative accounting practices facilitate debt contracting (e.g., 
Watts, 2003; Ball et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2008). In particular, Nikolaev (2010) 
shows that covenants in public debt contracts are positively associated with the degree 
of timely loss recognition, implying that bondholders demand conservative 
accounting for the covenants before bond issuance. Our evidence suggests that after 
the initiation of debt contracts, the monitoring by banks could further constrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior in financial reporting behavior and improve accrual 
quality. Our study thus enriches the literature by documenting the effect of banks on 
accrual quality after loan initiations.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related 
studies and develops the hypotheses. We describe the data, sample and research 
design in Section 3, report empirical results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Studies and Hypothesis Development 
 It has been well accepted in banking and finance literature that banks are 
effective monitors of borrowers’ performance. Relative to other stakeholders, banks 
have stronger incentives to monitor borrowers due to the asymmetric payoffs to their 
investments that have limited upside potentials but bear all the downside risk. 
Diamond (1984) proposes that banks have lower cost of delegation and thus are more 
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likely to be the entrusted monitors. Furthermore, Fama (1985) shows that banks can 
have direct access to borrowers’ operations and information systems, which allows 
banks to have an information advantage relative to other financial intermediaries. 
While prior studies have documented that banks can intervene when firms violate debt 
covenants (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi, 2009, 2012), there is limited evidence on whether bank monitoring plays a role 
when borrowers do not breach loan covenants.  
 One related stream of research examines the association between borrowers’ 
accounting quality and banks’ lending decisions at the inception of loans. One view is 
that better accounting quality allows banks to have a more accurate forecast of a 
borrower’s future performance and thus a more precise estimate of a borrower’s 
default risk. As a result, banks offer better loan terms to borrowers with higher 
accounting quality. Consistent with this view, Bharath et al. (2008) find that firms 
with smaller discretional accruals have a lower loan spread, a larger loan amount, and 
a longer loan maturity. Another view in the accounting literature focuses on the 
asymmetric payoff of banks and argues that banks demand borrowers have a 
conservative financial reporting system that reflects expected losses on a more timely 
manner than expected gains (Watts, 2003). Conservative accounting implies that loan 
covenants that are based on reported accounting numbers can serve as effective ‘trip 
wires’ that will be triggered and allow banks the opportunity to step in and intervene 
when a firm’s performance start to deteriorate. The evidence from Nikolaev (2010) 
shows that financial covenants in public debt contracts are positively related to the 
degree of asymmetric timely loss recognition, consistent with conservative accounting 
that facilitates the use of accounting numbers in loan contracts. Overall, this stream of 
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literature shows that banks do carefully consider the quality of borrowers’ financial 
reporting before loan initiations, consistent with banks’ credit control requirements.  
 Borrowers, however, have incentives to manage accounting numbers after loan 
initiations. One incentive is to meet the loan covenants that are based on accounting 
numbers. Prior studies have documented that covenant violations can result in many 
negative events such as loan renegotiation, increased loan cost, or even early 
termination of the loan (e.g., Beneish and Press, 1993). To avoid these negative 
consequences, borrowers have strong incentives to avoid debt covenants if they are 
able to do so at a cost lower than the expected benefits. Accounting literature has 
proposed and tested this ‘debt covenant hypothesis’ that states that borrowers manage 
accounting numbers to avoid debt covenant violations. Most empirical tests, however, 
rely on a sample of firms that report debt covenants in their annual reports and 
examine the estimated discretional accruals for the sample firms in the periods around 
the violations. Because firms can avoid reporting covenant violation by renegotiating 
with the banks, the reported violations are often serious ones that cannot be ‘cured’ 
before the report date. Focusing on this sample of firms for evidence of earnings 
management is problematic because, while these firms do have a strong incentive to 
manage earnings, the violations also suggest that banks will intervene and take over 
control of the borrowers. Bank intervention implies intensified monitoring, and thus it 
is unclear if borrowers still desire to manage earnings when they are under close 
watch by the banks.  
 The empirical evidence on the ‘debt covenant hypothesis’ is mixed. While 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) find evidence of accruals 
management, Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) do not find support 
for the hypothesis. More recently, Jha (2013) finds borrowers manage earnings 
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upward before covenant violations and then manage earnings downward after the 
violations. One issue with these studies is they rely on estimated discretional accruals 
from various versions of Jones’ model. Jackson (2017) demonstrates that the 
estimated discretional accruals have little power in detecting earnings management, 
making it even harder to draw any conclusion from the above studies.  
In contrast, Dichev and Skinner (2002) examine the distribution of two 
financial ratios used in loan covenants. They find an unusually small number of 
observations just below covenant thresholds and an unusually large number of 
observations at or just above covenant thresholds. Although the evidence seems to be 
consistent with the ‘debt covenant hypothesis’ that borrowers manage accounting 
numbers to shift the financial ratios to the level just above the covenant thresholds, 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) acknowledge that an alternative explanation is that banks 
ex ante set the covenant thresholds just below the actual value of the financial ratios. 
Further, the distribution of the ratios does not provide evidence on how borrowers 
manage accounting numbers to meet the thresholds.  
 Ahn and Choi (2009) investigate whether bank monitoring constrains 
borrowers’ earnings management. They find that borrowers’ discretional accruals are 
negatively associated with the loan amount, loan maturity and the number of lenders. 
They interpret the evidence as suggesting that bank monitoring reduces managers’ 
opportunistic behavior in financial reporting. Their evidence is consistent with the 
findings in Bharath et al. (2008). However, Bharath et al. (2008) interpret the 
evidence as suggesting that banks reward borrowers’ higher accounting quality with 
better loan terms. Because the evidence in both studies is only based on the cross-
sectional association, endogeneity issues make it hard to differentiate between these 
two competing interpretations.  
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 Despite the lack of evidence, banks do have incentives to monitor borrowers’ 
financial reporting practices after loan initiations for several reasons. First, banks need 
to monitor borrowers’ operations to assess the risk and performance of the loans, and 
financial reporting is an important source of information for banks. Although banks 
may have access to private information not contained in financial statements, 
information in financial statements can help banks to verify their private information 
and better assess the risk (Bharath et al., 2008). Second, as a result of agency conflicts, 
borrowers’ managers may divert firms’ resources to either themselves or to 
shareholders at the cost of debtholders. There is an incentive for borrowers’ managers 
to manipulate reported accounting numbers to camouflage such agency problems 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Therefore, banks also need to monitor borrowers’ financial 
reporting for warnings signs of agency conflicts that either decrease borrowers’ future 
cash flows or increase borrowers’ risk.  
Third, loan covenants, particularly financial covenants, are often based on 
reported accounting numbers. 6  The covenants provide banks with legal rights to 
intervene and take control of borrowers (Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009, 2012). As the 
‘debt covenant hypothesis’ states, managers may opportunistically manage accounting 
numbers such as accruals to meet the covenant requirements, which makes the 
covenant less effective as a ‘trip wire’ to alert banks of the borrowers’ deteriorating 
performance and increasing risk. Thus banks would continue to demand conservative 
and high quality financial reporting after loan initiations to ensure financial covenants 
are observed as expected.  
                                                     
6 One may argue that banks may not monitor reported accounting numbers because loan contracts can 
be written on modified accounting numbers that are different from those reported in financial 
statements. Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) show that (1) a substantial number of loan contracts do not 
make any modification to reported accounting numbers; and (2) the accounting modifications in loan 
contracts are also driven by banks’ demand for conservative financial reporting and concerns for 
agency problems. 
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 In this study, we focus on banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers’ financial 
reporting due to the existence of financial covenants, while assuming the other 
incentives will be held constant. In particular, we compare the borrowers of loans with 
financial covenants with borrowers of loans without covenants. We expect that the 
existence of financial covenants indicates that banks will monitor more closely and 
exercise more influence on borrowers’ financial reporting practices. As a result of 
increased monitoring, borrowers of loans with financial covenants are more likely to 
constrain their opportunistic financial reporting behavior such as accrual management 
that is used to overstate earnings or assets. This indicates that these borrowers are 
more likely to experience a larger improvement in their accrual quality after the loan 
initiations, relative to borrowers of loans without financial covenants.  This discussion 
leads to our first hypothesis stated in the alternative form as follows: 
H1: Borrowers of bank loans with financial covenants experience a larger 
improvement in accrual quality after loan initiations than borrowers of 
loans without financial covenants. 
 We note that this hypothesis focuses on the comparison between borrowers of 
loans with and without financial covenants to shed light on the evidence of bank 
monitoring improving accounting quality. An alternative way to provide evidence is 
to compare firms with bank loans to firms without bank loans, assuming firms with 
banks loans receive no monitoring from banks. While intuitive, this alternative design 
choice has the difficulty that bank loans, as an important external financing source, 
could mechanically affect the accrual generating process and result in increased 
accruals when borrowers invest the cash from the loans to increase their assets (Shan 
et al., 2009). Therefore, a comparison between firms with and without bank loans may 
not be able to provide clean evidence on the monitoring role of banks. In contrast, 
13 
 
when we focus on the comparison between borrowers of loans with and without 
financial covenants, these borrowers all have loans and their accruals are all affected 
by the bank loans, which allows us to control for the effect of external financing on 
accruals. This comparison should thus provide cleaner evidence on the banks’ 
monitoring role.  
 Banks are not the only stakeholders that can monitor borrowers’ performance 
and accounting practices. The literature has provided evidence that other financial 
intermediaries can also perform a monitoring role and influence firms’ financial 
reporting. For example, Yu (2008) shows that financial analysts, a group of 
sophisticated users of accounting information, are positively related to firms’ 
accounting quality, suggesting analysts’ monitoring helps constrain firms’ earnings 
management and leads to better accounting quality. Matsumoto (2002) finds that 
firms with a higher level of institutional ownership are less likely to have income-
increasing accruals to meet or beat earning targets. Firm ownership by long-term 
institutional investors is also related to less accruals management and real activity 
earnings management (Bushee, 1998; Chung et al., 2002; Koh, 2007). Taken together, 
these studies suggest that financial analysts and institutional investors can perform a 
monitoring role and help improve firms’ accounting quality. When multiple monitors 
are present, it is possible that they substitute for each other’s monitoring efforts, as 
monitoring is costly to each of the monitors. In particular, when external monitoring 
by analysts and institutional investors is weak, banks may find it necessary to exercise 
more monitoring and closely watch borrowers’ financial reporting practices. In 
contrast, when borrowers’ accounting quality is sufficiently high due to intense 
scrutiny by analysts and institutional investors, banks’ monitoring has a weaker 
incremental effect on borrowers’ accounting quality. We thus expect that banks’ 
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monitoring role to be stronger when borrowers have weaker external monitoring by 
financial analysts and institutional investors. This leads to our second hypothesis 
stated in alternative form as follows: 
H2: The effect of financial covenants on accrual quality will be stronger when 
borrowers have a smaller number of financial analysts following and a 
lower level of institutional ownership. 
 Banks’ incentive to monitor borrowers also varies with their stake in the loan 
syndicate, with larger stakes likely motivating banks to exercise more effort in 
monitoring the borrowers. Lead banks are often entrusted as the principal monitor of 
borrowers’ performance and risk, with other participating banks and institutions 
performing a secondary role in monitoring. We thus focus on the share of the loan 
held by the lead bank in the loan syndicate. If the lead bank retains a larger share of 
the loan, we expect the lead bank will have more incentive to monitor a borrower’s 
financial reporting. This leads to our third hypothesis stated in alternative form as 
follows: 
H3: The effect of financial covenants on accrual quality will be stronger when 
lead banks have a larger share of the loan. 
3. Data, Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Data and sample  
Our sample selection starts with loan data for US borrowers in Dealscan from 
1988 to 2012. Following Sufi (2007) and Ball et al. (2008), we perform our analysis at 
the deal level, and treat each loan deal as a separate observation or event. If there is 
more than one loan to a firm in a quarter, we only retain the loan with the most 
financial covenants. We then obtain accounting data of borrowers from Compustat 
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and stock returns from CRSP. After requiring the sample firms to have non-missing 
data for the variables used in the multivariate analysis, our final sample contains 7,107 
loans. 
3.2 Measures of accrual quality 
To measure accrual quality, we employ the measure developed by Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) and based on the mapping between accruals and cash flows. 
Because accrual accounting shifts the timing of recognition of cash flows, high quality 
accruals are more likely to be translated into cash flows in adjacent accounting 
periods. Banks usually focus on cash flows, and thus bank monitoring of financial 
reporting should lead to higher accrual quality or the larger probability that accruals 
(such as accounts receivables) can be transformed into cash flows. Specifically, we 
estimate the following regressions using quarterly accounting data: 
ܹܥܣ௜,௤ 	ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܥܨ௜,௤ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܱܥܨ௜,௤ ൅ ߚଷܱܥܨ௜,௤ାଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                   (1) 
where ܹܥܣ௜,௤ is the working capital accruals for firm i in quarter q, calculated as the 
change in operating noncash working capital. OCF is cash flow from operations in 
quarter q-1, q and q+1. All the variables are scaled by the total assets at the end of 
quarter t. The R2 from the regression captures the extent to which the current quarter’s 
working capital accruals are related to cash flows in adjacent quarters. A larger R2 
indicates a stronger association between accruals and cash flows, and thus higher 
accrual quality.  
For each loan in the sample, we first estimate Equation 1 using the borrowers’ 
accounting data in the eight quarters prior to the quarter in which loans are initiated. 
The R2 from this regression is termed as AQ_prior. We then re-estimate Equation 1 
using the same borrowers’ accounting data in the eight quarters after the quarter in 
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which loans are initiated, and term the R2 from this regression as AQ_post.7 Finally, 
we calculate changes in accrual quality after loan initiation such that ܣܳ = AQ_post 
- AQ_prior. We use ܣܳ to measure the extent to which accrual quality has improved 
after the loan initiation.  
3.3 Regression models 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions: 
ܣܳ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܥ ൅ ߚଶܵܫܼܧ ൅ ߚଷܵܣܮܧܸܱܵܮ ൅ ߚସܱܥܨܸܱܮ 
൅ߚହܯܤ ൅ ߚ଺ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ 
	൅ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ                                                                
(2) 
where ΔAQ is the change in accrual quality around the loan initiations, as defined 
above. The variable of interest is FC, an indicator variable equal to 1 for borrowers 
whose loans contain financial covenants, and 0 for borrowers whose loans do not have 
financial covenants. Our H1 predicts that the coefficient of FC is positive, or ߚଵ ൐ 0, 
suggesting borrowers of loans with financial covenants experience a larger 
improvement in accrual quality. In a robustness test, we also use the number of 
financial covenants to examine if more financial covenants are related to larger 
improvements in accrual quality. Specifically, we define FC_N as the natural log of 
the sum of 1 and the number of financial covenants. When replacing FC with FC_N 
in Equation 2, we expect the coefficient of FC_N to be positive as well, implying 
more financial covenants lead to increased bank monitoring and a larger improvement 
in accrual quality.  
To test H2, we partition the sample based on the median of the number of 
financial analysts following to form two subsamples. We also partition the sample 
                                                     
7 The quarter in which the loan is initiated is not used for either regression to allow a transition period.  
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based on the median of the level of institutional ownership of the borrowers. We then 
estimate Equation 2 for each subsample, and compare the coefficient of FC. H2 
predicts that the coefficient will be larger for the subsample with below-median 
analysts following and for the subsample with below-median institutional ownership. 
Similarly, to test H3, we partition the sample based on the median of the proportion of 
loans retained by the lead bank, and estimate Equation 2 for each subsample. We 
expect FC to have a larger coefficient in the subsample where lead banks keep a 
larger portion of loans in the loan syndicate.  
We follow Francis et al. (2005) to include a number of control variables in 
Equation 2 that are likely to be related to accrual quality. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s total assets. OPCYCLE is the natural log of the sum of the firm’s days 
accounts receivable and days inventory. SALESVOL is the standard deviation of the 
firm’s rolling eight-quarter sales scaled by the ending total assets. OCFVOL is the 
standard deviation of the firm’s rolling eight-quarter cash flow from operations scaled 
by the ending total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. NegEarn is the proportion of losses over the prior eight quarters. Since we 
focus on the changes in the accrual quality, we also calculate the changes in these 
control variables and include changes in the regressions. Finally, we control for 
industry- and year-fixed effects, and adjust standard errors from regressions for the 
clustering effect at the firm level.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Effect of financial covenants on accrual quality 
 To test H1, we start with a univariate analysis by dividing loans into two 
groups based on whether they have financial covenants and then compare the changes 
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in accrual quality after loan initiations for borrowers of loans with and without 
financial covenants. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the borrowers in these 
two groups and tests whether they have equal mean and median of the variables. The 
result shows that, on average, borrowers of loans with financial covenants experience 
an increase in accrual quality (∆AQ = 0.001), while borrowers of loans without 
financial covenants experience a decline in accrual quality (∆AQ = -0.018).8 The 
difference in the mean of ∆AQ is statistically significant. The evidence is consistent 
with H1 that borrowers of loans with financial covenants have a larger improvement 
in accrual quality after loan initiations. Regarding changes in firm characteristics, the 
borrowers of loans with financial covenants have a larger increase in total assets 
(∆SIZE = 0.111) after loan initiations. The changes in other firm characteristics, 
however, do not differ significantly between the two groups of borrowers.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used 
in the multivariate analyses. Consistent with the result in Table 1, FC is positively 
related to ∆AQ. Furthermore, FC_N is also positively related to ∆AQ, suggesting that 
the number of financial covenants is positively associated with changes in accrual 
quality. These correlations support H1 that financial covenants motivate banks to 
exercise more monitoring of borrowers’ financial reporting, which improves accrual 
quality. ∆AQ is also associated with ∆OCFVOL and ∆MB, both of which do not have 
significant correlations with either FC or FC_N. The correlation coefficients between 
control variables (changes in firm characteristics) are generally small in magnitude, 
                                                     
8 The decline may be partially driven by an overall decrease in the association between accruals and 
cash flows in US public firms over the past 50 years, as documented by Bushman et al. (2016). 
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suggesting multicollinearity may not be a serious concern for the multivariate 
regressions.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Table 3 reports the results from multivariate regressions using ∆AQ as the 
dependent variable. In Models 1 and 3, we include only the variables of interest, FC 
and FC_N, and industry- and year-fixed effects. In Models 2 and 4, we add control 
variables for changes in firm characteristics. In all the models, the variables of interest 
have positive and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting the financial 
covenants lead to a larger improvement in accrual quality. The estimated coefficient 
of FC in Model 2 is 0.027 (p-value = 0.002), suggesting that the R2 from regressions 
of accruals on adjacent cash flows is 2.7 percentage points larger for borrowers of 
loans with financial covenants. Given the average change in R2 for the sample firms is 
only -0.009, an improvement of 2.7 percentage points is economically significant as 
well. This result provides strong support to H1 that intensified bank monitoring 
associated with financial covenants results in a larger improvement in accrual quality 
of borrowers of loans with financial covenants.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Regarding the control variables, ∆OCFVOL is negatively associated with ∆AQ, 
suggesting an increase in cash flow volatility results in weaker mapping between cash 
flows and accruals. ∆MB is positively related to ∆AQ. Other control variables do not 
have statistically significant coefficients, which may not be surprising as we examine 
changes in these variables and firm characteristics tend to be quite stable and usually 
do not change dramatically over time.  
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4.2 Effect of external monitoring and loan structure 
 To test H2 that predicts that the effect of financial covenants on accrual quality 
will be stronger when monitoring by other stakeholders is weaker, we divide the 
sample into subsamples based on the strength of external monitoring by institutional 
investors and financial analysts. We then estimate Equation 2 separately for each 
subsample and compare the coefficients of FC. Table 4 reports the results.  
 In Models 1 and 2, we divide the sample by the median of institutional 
ownership in borrowing firms. The result shows that in the subsample where 
borrowers have a low institutional ownership, FC has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.033, p-value = 0.035). But in the subsample of 
borrowers with a high institutional ownership, the coefficient of FC becomes 
statistically insignificant. The evidence supports H2 that when institutional ownership 
is low and external monitoring by institutional investors is weak, bank monitoring has 
a larger impact on accrual quality. Similarly, we find that FC has a positively and 
statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 0.043, p-value = 0.002) in Model 3 
where borrowers receive a low level of analyst coverage. But the coefficient becomes 
insignificant in Model 4 where borrowers have more analyst coverage. The evidence 
suggests when analyst coverage is low and analyst monitoring is weaker, bank 
monitoring is more important in improving borrowers’ accrual quality. Overall, the 
results in Table 4 support H2. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 H3 predicts that bank monitoring will be stronger when lead banks retain a 
larger share of the loan. To test this prediction, we divide the sample into two 
subsamples based on the median of the proportion of loans held by lead banks. Table 
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5 reports the results from regressions estimating Equation 2 separately for the two 
subsamples. We find that FC has a coefficient of 0.044 (p-value = 0.071) in Model 1 
where lead banks hold a smaller share of the loans. The coefficient of FC increases to 
0.079 (p-value = 0.001) in Model 2 where lead banks retain a larger shares of loans. 
The evidence suggests that the effect of financial covenants on accrual quality is 
stronger when lead banks hold a larger share of the loan and have more incentives to 
monitor borrowers’ financial reporting practices related to financial covenants. 
Therefore, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the prediction of H3. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3 Evidence from analysts’ information environment 
We have documented empirical evidence supporting our main hypothesis that 
bank monitoring improves accrual quality. In this subsection, we provide some 
supporting evidence based on the properties of analysts’ forecasts. The rationale is 
that if loan covenants and bank monitoring improves accounting quality, financial 
analysts as a group of sophisticated users of accounting information should benefit 
from the improved accrual quality and have a better information environment. This 
rationale predicts that after loan initiations, analysts’ earnings forecasts will become 
more accurate and less dispersed for borrowers of loans with financial covenants, 
compared to their forecasts for borrowers of loans without financial covenants.   
To test this prediction, we examine changes in analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
forecast dispersion after loan initiations. Specifically, for each loan, we select a 
sample of analysts’ forecasts for borrowers’ quarterly earnings. Following the 
literature, we only retain the last forecasts of each analyst for each firm-quarter. For 
each quarter, we calculate forecast accuracy as -1 multiplied by the absolute value of 
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differences between actual earnings per share and the median of forecast earnings per 
share, deflated by share prices at the beginning of the quarter. We compute forecast 
dispersion as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts in the quarter, deflated by 
share prices at the beginning of the year. Then we calculate the mean forecast 
accuracy and mean forecast dispersion in the eight quarters prior to the loan initiation, 
as well as the mean forecast accuracy and dispersion in the eight quarters after the 
loan initiation. The changes in forecast accuracy (∆Accuracy) and forecast dispersion 
(∆Dispersion) are thus computed as the mean in the post-loan period minus the mean 
in the pre-loan period. 
Furthermore, we follow the method developed by Barron et al. (1998) to 
calculate empirical measures of the precision of analysts’ common and private 
information. Based on a set of assumptions, Barron et al. (1998) show that researchers 
can estimate the precision of analysts’ common information (h) and private 
information (s) using observable analyst forecasts in the following way:  
D Dh SE SE D
N N
                                                   (3) 
 
Ds D SE D
N
                                                     (4) 
 
where SE is the square of the absolute difference between the actual earnings per 
share and the mean forecasts, D is the standard deviation of the forecasts, and N is the 
number of analysts issuing forecasts. A larger h or larger s indicates that analysts’ 
common or private information is more precise. This approach has been used in a 
number of prior studies including Barron et al. (2008, 2017). 
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 The estimation of the precision of analysts’ private and common information 
requires the firm to have at least two analysts issuing the forecasts, which results in a 
more restrictive sample. Using quarterly forecasts, we estimate h and s for each 
quarter, and then compute the mean of h and s in the eight quarters prior to loan 
initiations, as well as their means in the eight quarters after loan initiations. Then we 
calculate the changes in h and s (∆h and ∆s) using the mean in the post-loan period 
minus the mean in the pre-loan period.  
To examine the effect of financial covenants on analysts’ forecasts, we 
estimate the following multivariate regressions: 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ	ሺܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊,݄,ݏሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܥ ൅ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅
ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ	 ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ 	ߝ                              
(5) 
where dependent variables are ∆Accuracy, ∆Dispersion, ∆h and ∆s, respectively. The 
variable of interest is FC, and we expect its coefficient to be positive when ∆Accuracy, 
∆h and ∆s are the dependent variables, suggesting that financial covenants are related 
to a larger improvement in forecast accuracy and precision of analysts’ information. 
We expect FC to have a negative coefficient when ∆Dispersion is the dependent 
variable, implying financial covenants are related to a larger decline in forecast 
dispersion after loan initiations. 
We include a set of control variables that prior studies have shown to be 
related to analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Hope, 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). Specifically, 
we control for the number of analysts following (Analysts, the natural log of the 
number of analysts following the firm), earnings volatility (VarEarn, the standard 
deviation of actual earnings per share in the prior eight quarters), accounting losses 
(Loss, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports accounting losses in the 
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quarter, and 0 otherwise), and forecast horizon (Horizon, the number of days between 
the date of median forecast date and quarterly earnings announcement date). We 
include firm size (SIZE, the natural log of total assets) and market-to-book ratios (MB) 
to control for the general firm characteristics, in addition to year- and industry-fixed 
effects. Besides these common control variables for all the models, in models using 
∆Dispersion, ∆h and ∆s as dependent variables, we also control for the magnitude of 
earning surprises (Surprise, the absolute value of the difference between actual 
earnings and median earnings forecast and deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of the quarter). When examining the precision of analysts’ information, we also 
control for forecast dispersion and ROA. To be consistent with the calculation of the 
dependent variables, we calculate and include in regressions the changes in these 
control variables using their mean in the pre-loan period minus the mean in the post-
loan period.  
Table 6 reports the results from regressions examining the effect of financial 
covenants on analysts’ forecasts. As expected, we find that FC is positively related to 
∆Accuracy, ∆h and ∆s (in Models 1, 3 and 4) and negatively related to ∆Dispersion 
(in Model 2), suggesting that analysts’ forecasts become more accurate and less 
dispersed after loan initiation for borrowers of loans with financial covenants. 
Analysts’ information for these borrowers also becomes more precise in the post-loan 
period. Overall, the evidence from analysts’ forecasts corroborates our main results 
that financial covenants and associated banking monitoring help improve accrual 
quality.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.4 Robustness tests  
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 We conduct a number of additional tests to ensure our main results are robust 
to alternative explanations and alternative design choices.   
First, our main variable of interest is the financial covenants and we argue that 
financial covenants motivate banks to exercise additional monitoring of borrowers’ 
financial reporting. One concern is that other loan terms, such as loan amount and 
loan maturity, are also likely to be correlated with financial covenants and bank 
monitoring. Therefore, it is possible that our main results are driven by these loan 
terms rather than financial covenants. To address this concern, we include a number 
of loan terms as additional control variables including general covenants (GC, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan contract contains general covenants, and 0 
otherwise), loan amount (Amount, the natural log of the amount of the loan), loan 
security (Security, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan requires collateral, and 0 
otherwise), and loan maturity (Maturity, the log of the number of months between 
loan initiation and maturity date).  
The results from regressions with these additional controls are reported in 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7. We find that our main results remain unchanged after 
controlling for these loan terms, and financial covenants continue to be positively 
related to improvements in accrual quality. Interestingly, we find general covenants 
are not associated with changes in accrual quality, suggesting that general covenants, 
which are not based on accounting numbers, do not provide incentives for banks to 
monitor borrowers’ financial reporting practices and improve borrowers’ accrual 
quality. The contrast in the results from financial covenants and general covenants 
lends strong support to our hypothesis that financial covenants motivate banks to 
monitor borrowers’ accounting quality.  
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In our empirical tests, we include all the loans in the sample. One issue is that 
a borrower may have multiple loans in a short period of time and thus their pre-loan 
period for one loan may overlap with the post-loan period for another loan. To address 
this issue, we select a cleaner sample of loans requiring that a borrower has no other 
loans in the eight quarters before and eight quarters after the current loan. This 
essentially requires a borrower to have only one loan in a 16-quarter period and 
eliminates the possibility that a borrower has overlapping loan periods. The result 
from regressions using this smaller sample is reported in Model 3 in Table 7. FC 
continues to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient (coefficient = 
0.029, p-value = 0.046), suggesting that our main results are not driven by the overlap 
between pre- and post-loan periods. 
To measure accrual quality, we use the empirical measure developed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and based on the mapping between accruals and cash 
flows. Although this measure has been widely used in the literature and we believe it 
captures banks’ focus on cash flow, there are many other measures of accrual quality 
in the literature. One feature of high quality accruals is that accruals are more 
positively related to future earnings, since low quality accruals tend to reverse in the 
future and thus lead to lower earnings. To examine this alternative measure of accrual 
quality, we estimate the following regression for each firm:  
ܴܱܣ௜,௤ାଵ 	ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܥܨ௜,௤ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ௜,௤ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                           (6) 
 
where ROA is the income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets, OCF is 
the operating cash flow deflated by total assets, and Accrual is income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flow, deflated by total assets. The 
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coefficient of Accrual, or β2, captures the extent to which current accruals are related 
to future ROA. A larger β2 indicate the accruals are of a higher quality. We estimate 
Equation 6 to obtain estimated β2 using quarterly data in the eight quarters before and 
eight quarters after the loan initiation, and then compute the changes in β2 around the 
loan initiation.  
 The result from the regression using changes in β2 as the dependent variable is 
reported in Model 4 in Table 7. We find that FC has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, suggesting that financial covenants are positively related to 
improvements in accrual quality. Overall, the result shows that our main results are 
robust to this alternative measure of accrual quality.  
5. Conclusions 
 We investigate whether bank monitoring constrains borrowers’ opportunistic 
behavior in financial reporting and improves the quality of reported accounting 
numbers. Despite convincing arguments in corporate finance theory that banks are 
delegated and effective monitors (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985), there is limited 
evidence on the effect of bank monitoring on borrowers’ financial reporting behavior. 
Ahn and Choi (2009) document that some loan terms are associated with measures of 
accounting quality, but Bharath et al. (2008) interpret the evidence as suggesting that 
better accounting quality is rewarded with more favourable loan terms. In this study, 
we use an event study approach and focus on the changes in accrual quality after loan 
initiations to examine the effect of bank monitoring on accrual quality. Furthermore, 
we focus on the comparison between loans with and without financial covenants to 
have a cleaner test. 
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 Consistent with our hypothesis that financial covenants motivate banks to 
exercise more monitoring of borrowers’ financial reporting behavior, we find that 
financial covenants are positively associated with improvements in accrual quality. 
The evidence remains robust after we control for a number of firm characteristics and 
loan terms, use alternative measures of accrual quality, and exclude overlapping loan 
periods. We also find that the effect of financial covenants on accrual quality is 
stronger when external monitoring by institutional investors and financial analysts is 
weaker, and when lead banks hold a larger share of the loan and thus have more 
incentives to monitor. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that bank monitoring 
improves accounting quality. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in multivariate analyses. Borrowers are 
divided into two subsamples based on whether their loans have financial covenants or not. AQ is the 
change in accrual quality which is measured by the R2 from regressions of accruals on adjacent cash 
flows. We use accruals and cash flows in the eight quarters before and eight quarters after the loan 
initiation to estimate the regressions to obtain R2 for the pre- and post-loan periods, and then calculate 
the changes in R2 as AQ. FC is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the loan contract contains 
financial covenants, and 0 otherwise. FC_N is the log of the sum of 1 and the number of financial 
covenants in the loan contract. SIZE is the change in the log of total assets from the pre-loan period to 
the post-loan period. OPCYCLE is the change in the log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts 
receivable and days inventory from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. SALESVOL is the 
change in the standard deviation of sales scaled by total assets from the pre-loan period to the post-loan 
period. OCFVOL is the change in the standard deviation of cash from operations scaled by ending 
total assets from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. MB is the change in the market-to-book 
ratio from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. NegEarn is the change in the percentage of 
quarters with accounting losses from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. ***, ** and * indicate 
that the difference is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level based on two-tailed tests.  
 
  
Loans with financial 
covenants 
(N=3,517)  
(1) 
Loans without financial 
covenants 
(N=3,590)  
(2) 
 Differences in  
Variables  Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean  Median  
AQ 0.001 0.000 0.349 -0.018 0.000 0.334 0.019 ** 0.000 
SIZE 0.111 0.050 0.248 0.085 0.043 0.217 0.026 *** 0.007 ***
OPCYCLE -0.001 -0.002 0.254 0.002 0.000 0.255 -0.003  -0.002 
SALESVOL -0.001 0.000 0.040 -0.003 -0.001 0.048 0.002  0.001 **
OCFVOL 0.052 0.042 0.036 0.052 0.043 0.038 -0.000  -0.001 
MB -0.045 0.001 0.971 -0.049 -0.009 0.950 0.004  0.010 
NegEarn 0.006 0.000 0.103 0.006 0.000 0.096 -0.000  -0.000 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
Table 2 Correlation coefficients 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the multivariate analyses. Variables are defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * indicate that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) AQ 1.000        
(2) FC 0.028** 1.000       
(3) FC_N 0.026** 0.938*** 1.000      
(4) SIZE 0.009 0.055*** 0.089*** 1.000     
(5) OPCYCLE 0.012 -0.006 -0.006 0.015 1.000    
(6) SALESVOL 0.010 0.013 0.016 -0.185*** -0.021* 1.000   
(7) OCFVOL -0.040*** -0.006 -0.019 -0.123*** -0.029** -0.011 1.000  
(8) MB 0.029** 0.003 -0.004 -0.102*** -0.010 0.059*** 0.005 1.000 
(9) NegEarn -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.107*** -0.060*** 0.053*** 0.026** 0.007 
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Table 3 Effect of loan covenants on changes in accrual quality 
 
This table reports the results from regressions estimating Equation 2 for the full sample. Dependent variables are 
changes in accrual quality. All the variables are defined in Table 1. In parentheses are p-values based on the 
standard errors adjusted for clustering effect at the borrower level. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 Dependent Variable = AQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept  -0.354*** -0.003 -0.353*** 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.793) (0.000) (0.720) 
     
FC 0.026*** 0.027***   
 (0.001) (0.002)   
     
FC_N   0.018*** 0.019*** 
   (0.002) (0.004) 
     
     
∆SIZE  0.010  0.009 
  (0.612)  (0.661) 
     
∆OPCYCLE  0.015  0.004 
  (0.354)  (0.746) 
     
∆SALESVOL  0.076  0.072 
  (0.401)  (0.427) 
     
∆OCFVOL  -0.429***  -0.425*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
     
∆MB  0.010**  0.010** 
  (0.018)  (0.017) 
     
∆NegEarn  0.004  0.003 
  (0.927)  (0.945) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
N 9,949 7,107 9,949 7,107 
R2 0.008 0.015 0.008 0.015 
 
  
35 
 
Table 4 Effect of external monitoring 
 
This table reports the results from regressions estimating Equation 2 for subsamples. Models 1 and 2 use 
subsamples partitioned based on the median institutional ownership, while Models 3 and 4 use subsamples 
partitioned based on the median number of analysts following. Dependent variables are changes in accrual 
quality. All the variables are defined in Table 1. In parentheses are p-values based on the standard errors adjusted 
for clustering effect at the borrower level. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 Institutional ownership Analysts following 
 Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  -0.301*** -0.120** -0.010 -0.107*** 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.782) (0.009) 
     
FC 0.033** 0.004 0.043*** 0.013 
 (0.035) (0.801) (0.002) (0.288) 
     
∆SIZE 0.011 0.084** -0.032 0.065** 
 (0.757) (0.041) (0.192) (0.036) 
     
∆OPCYCLE 0.050* -0.004 0.020 0.014 
 (0.058) (0.906) (0.346) (0.561) 
     
∆SALESVOL 0.073 0.167 0.009 0.255 
 (0.475) (0.532) (0.926) (0.317) 
     
∆OCFVOL -0.492** -0.464* -0.360** -0.452** 
 (0.017) (0.079) (0.025) (0.023) 
     
∆MB 0.015* 0.012 0.005 0.014** 
 (0.052) (0.137) (0.442) (0.030) 
     
∆NegEarn 0.014 0.121 -0.033 0.057 
 (0.841) (0.180) (0.594) (0.401) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,393 2,550 3,264 3,843 
R2 0.035 0.026 0.031 0.022 
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Table 5 Effect of loan structure 
 
This table reports the results from regressions estimating Equation 2 for subsamples partitioned based on the 
median of the proportion of loans held by the lead bank in the loan syndicate. Dependent variables are changes 
in accrual quality. All the variables are defined in Table 1. In parentheses are p-values based on the standard 
errors adjusted for clustering effect at the borrower level. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 Lead Banks’ Shares 
 Small 
(1) 
Large 
(2)  
Intercept  0.014 0.002 
 (0.813) (0.978) 
   
FC 0.044* 0.079*** 
 (0.071) (0.001) 
   
SIZE 0.090* -0.048 
 (0.066) (0.223) 
   
OPCYCLE 0.032 -0.006 
 (0.379) (0.841) 
   
SALESVOL 0.248 0.229 
 (0.471) (0.122) 
   
OCFVOL -0.515* -0.437* 
 (0.097) (0.053) 
   
MB 0.004 0.013 
 (0.710) (0.161) 
   
NegEarn 0.021 -0.023 
 (0.850) (0.810) 
   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes 
N 1,704 1,460 
R2 0.042 0.061 
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Table 6 Effect of loan covenants on analysts’ information environment 
 
This table reports the results from regressions examining the effect of financial covenants on analysts’ 
information environment. Accuracy is the change in the average forecast accuracy, defined as -1 times the 
absolute value of the difference between actual and forecast earnings per share deflated by share prices at the 
beginning of the quarter, from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. Dispersion is the change in the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. h and s are the 
changes in the precision of analysts’ common and private information, respectively, from the pre-loan period to 
the post-loan period. The precision is estimated using the method in Barron et al. (1998). ∆Analysts is the 
change in the number of analysts following from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. ΔVarEarn is the 
change in the standard deviation of earnings per share from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. ∆SIZE is 
the change in the log of total assets from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. ∆MB is the change in the 
market-to-book ratio from the pre-loan period to the post-loan period. ∆Horizon is the change in the number of 
days between median forecast date and earnings announcement date. Loss is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
firms reporting accounting losses, and 0 otherwise. ∆Surprise is the change in earnings surprise, calculated as 
the absolute difference between forecast and actual earnings per share scaled by stock price, from the pre-loan 
period to the post-loan period. ∆ROA is the change in the ratio of net income to total assets, from the pre-loan 
period to the post-loan period. In parentheses are p-values based on the standard errors adjusted for clustering 
effect at the borrower level. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level based on two-tailed tests. 
 
  Accuracy 
(1) 
Dispersion 
(2) 
h 
(3)  
s 
(4) 
Intercept    
-0.114*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.772) 
-25.352*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-7.218 
(0.270) 
FC   
0.067*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015** 
(0.025) 
6.697*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
8.515* 
(0.089) 
∆Analysts   
0.160*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
(0.114) 
-2.462 
(0.319) 
 
 
-15.653*** 
(0.002) 
∆SIZE   
0.040 
(0.631) 
0.041** 
(0.048) 
-37.903*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-47.642*** 
(0.000) 
∆VarEarn   
-0.381*** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-2.932 
(0.256) 
 
 
-3.641 
(0.550) 
∆MB   
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004** 
(0.011)    
∆Horizon   
0.001 
(0.408) 
0.000*** 
(0.008)    
Loss   
-0.895*** 
(0.000) 
0.179*** 
(0.000)    
∆Surprise   8.898*** (0.000) 
-18.239 
(0.628) 
 
 
-275.334*** 
(0.002) 
∆Dispersion    15.632 (0.889) 
 
 
-215.797 
(0.462) 
∆ROA    39.970 (0.149) 
 
 
74.957 
(0.275) 
        
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes Yes   Yes 
N  12,951 12,152 12,010  12,010 
R2  0.082 0.116 0.018  0.012 
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Table 7 Robustness tests 
 
This table reports the results from robustness tests. In Models 1 and 2, we control for loan terms. In Model 3, we 
exclude loans of the same borrowers in the eight quarters before and eight quarters after the initiation of current 
loans. In Model 4, we use an alternative measure of accrual quality, based on the association between current 
accruals and future return on assets. GC is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan contract contains general 
covenants. Amount is the log of the total loan amount. Security is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan 
requires collateral, and 0 otherwise. Maturity is the log of months before the loan matures. Other variables are 
defined in Table 1. In parentheses are p-values based on the standard errors adjusted for clustering effect at the 
borrower level. ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Controlling for loan terms 
Excluding same 
borrowers’ loans in 
adjacent 16 quarters 
Using alternative 
measure of AQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  -0.016 -0.014 -0.330*** -0.230 
 (0.774) (0.805) (0.000) (0.393) 
     
FC 0.032**  0.029** 0.165* 
 (0.021)  (0.046) (0.086) 
FC_N  0.022**   
  (0.016)   
     
GC 0.004 0.004   
 (0.780) (0.657)   
     
Amount  0.002 0.002   
 (0.446) (0.456)   
     
Security -0.004 -0.005   
 (0.708) (0.602)   
     
Maturity -0.000* -0.000**   
 (0.055) (0.048)   
     
∆SIZE 0.003 0.001 0.027 -0.058 
 (0.874) (0.970) (0.543) (0.867) 
     
∆OPCYCLE 0.009 0.002 0.037 -0.161 
 (0.607) (0.893) (0.273) (0.191) 
     
∆SALESVOL 0.042 0.039 0.019 0.393 
 (0.638) (0.667) (0.852) (0.786) 
     
∆OCFVOL -0.429*** -0.417*** -0.485** 0.653 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.037) (0.689) 
     
∆MB 0.011** 0.011** 0.015** 0.013** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.036) (0.013) 
     
∆NegEarn -0.009 -0.010 -0.003 -0.395 
 (0.854) (0.840) (0.964) (0.358) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,545 6,545 2,887 15,833 
R2 0.014 0.013 0.025 0.001 
 
